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TWENTY-EIGHT YEARS LATER: DELANEY V. MCCOY 
AND SUPPLEMENTAL PARTITIONS OF COMMUNITY 
PROPERTY IN LOUISIANA 
Claire Murray* 
Twenty-eight years after Mack McCoy’s divorce, his ex-wife, 
Claudine McCoy Delaney, filed a supplemental petition for 
partition of community property.1 Ms. Delaney sought a pro rata 
share of Mr. McCoy’s retirement benefits. The Second Circuit 
Court of Appeal held that Ms. Delaney’s supplemental partition 
was not barred by res judicata because when an asset is omitted 
from a community property settlement by mutual oversight, the 
matter has not yet been adjudicated and is properly subject to 
modification. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Mack Allen McCoy and Claudine Mason McCoy Delaney 
married on November 16, 1973. On June 27, 1979, Mr. McCoy 
filed a petition for separation. After termination of the community 
property regime, Ms. Delaney filed a petition for settlement of the 
parties’ community property. Ms. Delaney propounded 
interrogatories to Mr. McCoy regarding the existence of a 
retirement plan related to his employment at the Shreveport Fire 
Department. He answered, “The parties have no vested interest in 
any retirement plan.”2 
 *  J.D./D.C.L. Candidate (May, 2014) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, 
Louisiana State University. Special thanks to Prof. Elizabeth Carter for her 
research suggestions, proofreading, and editing; to Prof. Olivier Moréteau for 
support and editing. 
 1. Delaney v. McCoy, 47,240 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/20/12), 93 So. 3d 845. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeal heard this dispute twice. The 2012 opinion, 
Delaney v. McCoy, 93 So. 3d 845, is the subject of this case note. 
 2. Delaney, 93 So. 3d at 847. 
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Following a trial, the court entered a judgment partitioning the 
community property. The judgment set forth which items of the 
former community were to be partitioned in kind and which were 
to be partitioned by licitation, yet the judgment made no mention 
of retirement benefits. 
Twenty-seven years later, Mr. McCoy retired from the fire 
department. The following year, Ms. Delaney filed a supplemental 
petition for partition of community property, alleging that the 
retirement benefits that had accrued during the marriage had been 
omitted from the prior community property partition. Mr. McCoy 
filed exceptions of res judicata and no right and no cause of action. 
The trial court denied the exceptions. Mr. McCoy then filed a 
petition for rehearing. Upon rehearing, the court granted Mr. 
McCoy’s exception of res judicata, reasoning that the existence of 
a settlement agreement itself indicated intent to settle all claims 
that either party had or may have against the former community of 
acquets and gains.3 
Ms. Delaney appealed the trial court decision granting Mr. 
McCoy’s exception of res judicata. Because Mr. McCoy failed to 
introduce critical documents into evidence, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeal found he had not met his burden of proof. The 
court remanded for further proceedings. 
On remand, the trial court held a hearing in June 2011. With all 
the required documentation admitted into evidence, the trial court 
again granted Mr. McCoy’s exception of res judicata. Ms. Delaney 
again appealed.  
II. DECISION OF THE COURT 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeal held that Ms. Delaney’s 
action was not barred by res judicata. Because the retirement 
benefits were never specifically mentioned in the community 
 3. See Delaney v. McCoy, 63 So. 3d 327 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2011) (the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeal’s first opinion in this matter). 
 
 
                                                                                                             
2013] DELANEY V. MCCOY 289 
 
property settlement, the partitioning of the asset had not been 
formerly adjudicated. Accordingly, the issue was not barred by res 
judicata. Ms. Delaney was entitled to file a supplementary petition 
for partition of community property.  
III. COMMENTARY 
Under Louisiana’s community property regime, each spouse 
owns a present, undivided one-half interest in the community 
during its existence.4 If a property right results from a spouse’s 
employment during the existence of the community, then it is a 
community asset and is subject to division upon dissolution of the 
marriage.5 When the community terminates, the employee’s 
spouse is the owner of one-half of the amount attributable to the 
pension or retirement benefit earned during the existence of the 
community.6  
Upon termination of the community property regime, the 
spouses, as co-owners, may extra-judicially partition the 
community property,7 or may seek judicial partition under the 
aggregate theory.8 Under this theory, the court allocates the 
community assets and liabilities so that each spouse receives 
property of equal net value.9 If the allocation results in an unequal 
net distribution, the court will order payment of an equalizing sum 
of money.10 The Delaney parties partitioned their community 
property voluntarily. 
The question presented in Delaney concerns how to 
appropriately treat a community property settlement agreement 
that fails to mention retirement benefits correspondent to a portion 
of time during the existence of the community property regime. 
 4. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2336 (2012). 
 5. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2338 (2012). 
 6. Day v. Day, 858 So. 2d 483, 491 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2003). 
 7. 16 KATHERINE S. SPAHT & RICHARD D. MORENO, LOUISIANA CIVIL 
LAW TREATISE: MATRIMONIAL REGIMES 661 (3d ed., West 2007). 
 8. Id. at 688. 
 9. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:2801(A)(4)(b) (2012). 
 10. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:2801(A)(4)(d) (2012). 
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Louisiana jurisprudence provides that, when an agreement does not 
expressly address the employee spouse’s pension, the issue of 
whether the agreement divests the other spouse of any community 
property right to the pension depends on the intent of the parties.11 
In order to determine the intent of the parties, the court will 
examine the agreement and other evidence to see whether the non-
employee spouse appears to have intended to abandon any future 
claims to the former community property.12 The resolution of the 
intent question determines the applicability of res judicata; if a 
non-employee spouse did not intend to divest him or herself of a 
right to the benefit, then the matter has not yet been adjudicated 
and res judicata does not apply. 
To ascertain the intent of the parties, the court will look for an 
indication that the parties discussed the asset during the events 
leading up to the drafting of the agreement. A lack of discussion 
regarding the asset tends to indicate that the non-employee spouse 
did not waive his or her right in the asset. In Robinson v. Robinson, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that supplementary 
partitions like Ms. Delaney’s have been allowed where the spouses 
had not discussed the pension or retirement benefits before 
confecting their community property settlements.13 In Robinson, 
the parties’ partition settlement did not address the division of the 
former husband’s pension plan. Moreover, both parties testified 
that they did not discuss the benefits in the context of their 
settlement.14 The court found that, since the benefits were never 
discussed, the former wife could not have intended to transfer her 
right in the pension plan.15 
In Adams v. Adams, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal held 
that a community property settlement could not be declared null 
 11. Jennings v. Turner, 803 So. 2d 963, 965 (La. 2001); see LA. CIV. CODE 
ANN. art. 2045 (2012). 
 12. See Robinson v. Robinson, 778 So. 2d 1105, 1120 (La. 2001). 
 13. Id. at 1119-21. 
 14. Id. at 1120. 
 15. Id. 
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based on the erroneous omission of an asset neither party knew 
they owned.16 In that case, the parties were unaware that a parcel 
of land was part of their community property. Accordingly, the 
parties made no mention of the parcel in their community property 
settlement. When the former wife tried to nullify the agreement on 
the basis of error, the court found that the agreement reflected only 
an intent to change their ownership interests as to the assets 
listed.17 
The original trial court in Delaney found that the settlement 
indicated an intent of the parties to settle all claims the parties may 
have had or will have in the future relating to the former 
community of acquets and gains.18 The Second Circuit, in its 
second Delaney opinion, adhered more strictly to the 
jurisprudential rule: even when an original partition expressly 
purports to be a full and final property settlement between the 
spouses, courts have allowed supplemental partitions of omitted 
assets when the facts and the intent of the parties warrant it.19 The 
court examined the record and found no evidence of a discussion 
beyond Mr. McCoy’s answer that there was no “vested interest” in 
retirement benefits.20 The court explained that, when neither party 
mentions retirement pay during negotiations and settlement, the 
failure to include the retirement pay in the settlement is a “mere 
omission” which can be amended by supplemental petition.21  
The law of res judicata has changed since the Delaney parties 
entered into their settlement. The changes were substantive and the 
court was required to apply the previous law. Under former 
Louisiana Civil Code article 2286: 
The authority of the thing adjudged takes place only with 
respect to what was the object of the judgment. The thing 
 16. Adams v. Adams, 503 So. 2d 1052, 1056 (La. Ct. App.. 1987). 
 17. Adams, 503 So. 2d at 1056. 
 18. Delaney, 93 So. 3d at 848. 
 19. Id. at 850. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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demanded must be the same; the demand must be founded 
on the same cause of action; the demand must be between 
the same parties, and formed by them against each other in 
the same quality.22 
Because Mr. McCoy was the party urging the exception, he had 
the burden of proving each essential element by a preponderance 
of the evidence. The Second Circuit held that the “thing 
demanded” was not the same.23 Because the parties did not discuss 
the benefits and Ms. Delaney did not expressly waive her right to 
them, the court found there was no adjudication of the particular 
asset at all. If any retirement benefits accrued during the marriage 
of the parties, Ms. Delaney has remained a co-owner and is entitled 
to a partition of the property.  
Though Ms. Delaney did not move to supplement the 
agreement until twenty-eight years after settlement, her right has 
not prescribed. Under Louisiana law, items omitted from judicial 
and extra-judicial partitions are always subject to supplementary 
partition; the right never prescribes.24 Under the successions 
section of the Civil Code, the mere omission of a thing belonging 
to the succession is not ground for rescission, but only for 
supplementary partition.25 By analogy, Louisiana courts have 
incorporated the successions rule into the matrimonial regimes 
context; when a plaintiff moves to file a supplementary petition of 
a community asset omitted from the original community property 
settlement through “mutual oversight,”26 he or she is entitled to do 
so and the right does not prescribe.  
Though the Second Circuit’s decision is legally sound, whether 
the decision is the right one is a more difficult determination. 
Delaney illustrates a clash between two important societal 
 22. Id. at 849 (emphasis added). 
 23. Delaney, 93 So. 3d at 851. 
 24. Succession of Tucker, 445 So. 2d 510 (La. Ct. App. 1984). 
 25. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1401 (2012). 
 26. Succession of Tucker, 445 So. 2d at 513. 
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interests: the doctrine of res judicata and Louisiana’s commitment 
to the community property regime. 
The doctrine of res judicata prohibits the re-litigation of claims 
that have been processed to final judgment in an action between 
the parties.27 In part, the doctrine exists to ensure judicial 
economy;28 courts simply do not have the time or resources to hear 
cases multiple times. Perhaps more importantly, res judicata 
guarantees the finality of judgment.29 In the Delaney case, it may 
seem unfair that Ms. Delaney sought a share of Mr. McCoy’s 
retirement benefits twenty-eight years after their separation, as res 
judicata is meant to impart a sense of certainty after the resolution 
of a legal dispute. But res judicata is not implicated when the 
judgment is not indeed final, even when the parties believe it to be.  
The facts in Delaney are unusual. Twenty-eight years had 
passed before Ms. Delaney brought this action seeking her share of 
Mr. McCoy’s retirement benefits. At first blush, the court’s 
decision would seem to defy the policy goals underlying res 
judicata: neither judicial economy nor fairness to Mr. McCoy 
would be served by allowing Ms. Delaney’s action to proceed. But 
the law is clear: a community property settlement, from which an 
asset was inadvertently omitted, is subject to supplemental 
partition at any time. On the facts of Delaney, however, the result 
appears to be absurd.  
Suppose a couple divorced after thirty years of marriage. Upon 
divorce, the couple voluntarily partitioned their community 
property. Due to a mutual oversight, the couple neglected to 
account for a particular community asset. If one of the former 
spouses realized his or her mistake just a year later, few would 
argue that the holdings of Delaney and its progeny would produce 
 27. FRANK L. MARAIST, 1A LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: CIVIL 
PROCEDURE – SPECIAL PROCEDURES 52 (West 2005). 
 28. Id. at n.8. 
 29. Id. 
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an unfair result by allowing the spouse to supplement the 
agreement.  
Suppose the neglected asset were exceptionally valuable. Even 
if the disadvantaged spouse did not realize the error until ten years 
later, most would find that fairness would be better served if he or 
she were allowed to supplement the agreement.  
Consider a couple married for just two years prior to divorce. If 
their community property settlement neglected to include an asset 
of even nominal value, few would argue that the disadvantaged 
spouse should not be able to supplement the agreement. 
The facts in Delaney distract from how fair the law actually is. 
Mr. McCoy and Ms. Delaney were married for less than six years, 
she initiated her action twenty-eight years after they settled their 
community property agreement, and the amount in question is 
likely minimal. Though the law applied in this case produced an 
unusual result, it is not difficult to imagine situations in which the 
law would be applied so as to adequately protect Louisiana’s 
community property regime. 
 
 
